Technical Case Study Assignment

Technical Case Study

Introduction - Technical Case Study

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The lead process engineer in a chemical manufacturing facility is attributed to various skeptical roles. They are allocated to various roles and responsibilities which are immensely important in the proper functioning of a chemical manufacturing system. One such chemical manufacturing system is Health First Global manufacturing system. It is responsible for the production of an active pharmaceutical ingredient or API. In the manufacturing of the API or active pharmaceutical ingredient, an intermediate formation requires hydrogen sulfide gas. There is a potential distraught in the Health First Global manufacturing unit due to the assumed reasons of issue at the bursting disc of the gas supply system. The potential leak of the H₂S or hydrogen sulfide gas in the scrubber of the gas supply chain as well as its potential leak into the environment can cause a serious concern, as the H₂S gas is considered to be the ‘knock down’ gas and can be very harmful and dangerous for the workers of the manufacturing unit as well as the operators of the manufacturing unit.

Discussions

Question A.

The potential root cause of the problem or the issue that arose in the Health first Global manufacturing system can be attributed to the quality of bursting disc used or installed in the gas supply system of the unit. A bursting disc or burst disc or the pressure safety disc is an open pressure succoring safety device which functions as a protective system for a manufacturing unit or equipment from the prospective damage due to the conditions of over pressurization. And in contrast to that situation, it also tends to protect the system from the damage or prospective disintegration in the manufacturing system due to the very potentially defacing vacuum conditions inside the equipment or the manufacturing unit.

Figure 1: Safety valves with bursting discs.

(Source: https://www.processindustryinformer.com)

The continuous working with the equipment that are required to deal with extra pressure presents a potential risk to the operators as well as workers, hence bursting discs are a crucial part of the manufacturing unit. These discs are utilized by the manufacturing units so as to establish the safety standards specifically mentioned under the ‘International Safety Standards’. The bursting disc of the manufacturing unit might lack effective relief valves for preventing the damage or any issues like leakage or corrosion. Proper installation and proper specification of the device is also important for preventing damage or any kind of leakage. Also careful inspection, regular maintenance and the proper cleaning of the bursting disc and the other components of the gas supply system is helpful for the preventive measure (Guijarro Fernandez and Sancho Naval, 2021). Moreover, lack of proper understanding of the rupture disc or bursting disc technology, the sealing mechanism and the assembly types is also a reason for the prospective damage or issue in the manufacturing unit. Installing the highest caliber bursting disc can help in the prevention of such leakages as well as damages that are required to stop the manufacturing of the API or active pharmaceutical ingredient. The bursting discs should be replaced and chosen on the basis of certain criteria like the ability to withstand numerous cycles, should operate at almost the selected pressure capacity, with good and effective sealing capacities etc. CDC or Continental Disc Corporation is one good choice for the replacement of the bursting disc, as the company’s bursting or rupture discs are tested to meet the requirements of stringent purity. They serve with other features like good reflective valves.

Figure 2: Different kinds of CDC’s bursting or rupture discs.

(Source:http://bursting-discs.co.uk)

Figure 3: The schematic diagram of the manufacturing unit

(Source: Self-Created)

With the schematic diagram provided in Figure 3, it is clear that the environmental release of H₂S or hydrogen sulfide gas is not prospectively possible. As the valve A shuts with increase in Pressure at the PSH mark. With the burst in the mechanical bursting disc or rupture disc the manufacturing unit will not be able to maintain a normal pressure range at the whole system and thereby the valve A shuts down automatically and the flow of H₂S gas from the hydrogen sulfide cylinder is automatically stopped (Rohde et al, 2020). But the H₂S gas or hydrogen sulfide gas present inside the manufacturing system can pass into the Scrubber, because as soon as the valve A shuts down automatically the valve G opens up and the remaining gas in the unit can pass onto the scrubber. This is potentially causing reflective inefficiency of the scrubber. But, its environmental leakage is not possible if the manufacturing unit is closed down immediately.

Question b.

There are serious assumptions that the H₂S or hydrogen sulfide gas has been released into the scrubber of the gas supply system (de Freitas Nader et al, 2021). The manufacturing was thereby needed to be stopped as it might cause serious issues or damage to the entire manufacturing unit. Moreover, the assumptions of leaking H₂S or hydrogen sulfide gas into the system or into the environment can cause serious and devastating outcomes. Hence, a lead process engineer needs to investigate the entire matter carefully and thereon the maintenance needs to be done upfront to restart the manufacturing process. The reflected issue is assumed to be the burst or damage of the bursting disc or the rupture disc of the manufacturing unit. The lead process engineer is required to carry out the proper tests to define the precision in the assumption of the damage in the bursting disc of the gas supply system of the manufacturing unit producing API or active pharmaceutical ingredient. The process engineer is supposed to take process developments with utter importance (Russell et al, 2020). The various trials and tests that can finally lead to the proper identification of the issue at the Health First Global manufacturing unit are to be retracted by the lead process engineer. The various trials and tests will include:

• The use of ‘system level integration’ methods can help provide the required aid for the lead process engineer for understanding the nitigrities of the issue.
• The installation of the ‘pressure-relieving devices or PRDs’ and their complementary ‘pressure-relief system or PRSs’ are thoroughly checked by the lead process engineer.
• The burst tolerance of the bursting disc or the rupture disc investigation can provide a clear insight to the lead process engineer about the actual reason for the burst or damage to the rupture disc (Zhou et al, 2022). Moreover, the thorough investigation of the pressure prevalence in the manufacturing unit or more specifically in the gas supply chain is also inquired for understanding the reasons of the burst disc failure or the rupture disc failure.
• The valves and the pressure units of the entire manufacturing unit need to be tested for damage verification. The pressure range difference might cause a lot of damage to other valves of the manufacturing unit of the Health First Global manufacturing unit.
• The pressure range in the manufacturing unit also tends to indulge with the purity outlook of the manufacturing of the API or active pharmaceutical ingredient (Rezgui iet al, 2019). Therefore, proper investigation or tests are to be carried out for testing all the safety valves as well as the cylinder knobs and tubes and tunnels available for the passage of nitrogen gas and hydrogen sulfide gas.
• The lead process engineer should also check the last replacement time or last installation time of the rupture disc or the burst disc of the manufacturing unit. Because certain accidents happen due to the irresponsibility of the timely replacement or maintenance of the rupture disc or the burst disc.

The lead process engineer needs to identify the various aspects of the rupture disc failure to provide a good plan or strategy to restructure and resolve the issues related to the functions and roles of the rupture disc (Geng and Hu,, 2021). The failure of the rupture disc can anyways disregard a lot of associated functions and simultaneous damages to the various associated parts and aspects of the manufacturing unit and the gas supply system.

Figure 4: Process Engineer Roles

(Source:https://www.twi-global.com)

Question c.

In order to restart the manufacturing process, the problems and all the associated issues need to be attended to and should be resolved fruitfully (Zhou et al, 2022). The reinstallation of the bursting disc and the required other components of the entire manufacturing unit will consume a time span of around a tenure of four to five days with an efficient technical team and experts.. However, before proceeding towards the reinstallation of the required components of the manufacturing unit including the bursting disc or the rupture disc will require the lead process engineer to completely and thoroughly verify the process of testing and trials. The time requirement for the investigation of the appropriate and the exact damage will be required to set up a thorough idea of the prospective areas of damage (Cao et al, 2021). For example, the issue at the Health First Global manufacturing unit is considered to be the burst at the gas supply system at the bursting disc. The lead process engineer will be required to conduct trial testing for the efficiency of each of the components of the gas supply system. The components of the gas supply system will include the pressure relieving valves, the pressure relieving devices as well as the complementary pressure relieving systems and safety valves. In addition to that this gas supply system consists of a scrubber and the manually operated as well as automatic alarms and interlocks in the manufacturing unit like the high and low pressure switches or PSL and PSH (Yu et al, 2018). After a thorough checking of all the gas cylinders, pressure safety valves, pipes and pipelines, nitrogen and hydrogen sulfide gas cylinders, scrubbers and the relieved safety devices including the rupture disc or the bursting disc, the lead process engineer will put forward the plan to reinstall certain components that cannot be restored to function like the bursting disc or the rupture disc. And for the other components and electrical systems of the manufacturing unit certain maintenance and repair will need to be performed for restarting the services and the manufacturing function of the manufacturing unit of the Health First Global manufacturing for an uninterrupted and presenting production of the API at a commendable pace. The trials and the testing period is always time consuming and it depends on the extent and the effects of the burst damage on the gas supply system. The various methods that can further be implemented by the lead process engineer to reduce the risks of any such damages and the effectiveness of the rupture disc or the bursting disc to overcome potential pressure condition can be firstly the installation of a relief valve for the upstream of the rupture disc which can further help to minimize the loss due to leakage and also simultaneously prevents the corrosive gasses from entering into the internals of the relief valve as well as other parts of the manufacturing component like the scrubber (Yong et al, 2021). The scrubber is filled with sodium hydroxide and sodium hypochlorite solutions which can react with the hydrogen sulfide gas and thereby causes deterioration of the scrubber as well as the manufacturing unit.

Figure 5: Rupture Disc Burst Pressure

(Source: https://www.nationalboard.org/images/site_img/large/rupture_disk.jpg)

Figure 6: Bursting Disc Installation at a relief valve

(Source: https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/3-s2.0-B9781933762180500179-f09-10-9781933762180.jpg)

Conclusion

After evaluating the solutions for the mentioned three questions with reference to the bursting disc or rupture disc damage case in the Health First Global manufacturing unit, the following conclusion can be drawn that the criteria should be thoroughly followed while the installation of the nursing disc in equipment or any manufacturing unit. This part of the whole manufacturing unit play as very crucial role in maintaining the static pressure conditions at the inlet points. It is used as a protective shield against the over pressurization conditions inside the manufacturing units and also to prevent the equipment or the manufacturing unit from the conditions of potentially destructive vacuums. The chosen bursting disc should always be installed with relief valves and should have a comparatively high burst pressure for the disc to withstand extreme pressure conditions.

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References

Journals

Cao, W., Liu, Y., Chen, R., Li, W., Zhang, Y., Xu, S., Cao, X., Huang, Q. and Tan, Y., 2021. Pressure release characteristics of premixed hydrogen-air mixtures in an explosion venting device with a duct. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 46(12), pp.8810-8819.

Zhou, S., Luo, Z., Wang, T., He, M., Li, R. and Su, B., 2022. Research progress on the self-ignition of high-pressure hydrogen discharge: A review. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy.

Rezgui, N., Mickovi?, D.M., Živkovi?, S.Ž. and Ivanovi?, I.B., 2019. Experimental and numerical analysis of thermo-chemical erosion in gun steel. Thermal Science, 23(2 Part A), pp.599-612.

Zhou, K., Xiao, L., Lin, Y., Yuan, D. and Wang, J., 2022. A Statistical Analysis of Hazardous Chemical Fatalities (HCFs) in China between 2015 and 2021. Sustainability, 14(4), p.2435.

de Freitas Nader, G.P., Agüera-Gonzalez, S., Routet, F., Gratia, M., Maurin, M., Cancila, V., Cadart, C., Palamidessi, A., Ramos, R.N., San Roman, M. and Gentili, M., 2021. Compromised nuclear envelope integrity drives TREX1-dependent DNA damage and tumor cell invasion. Cell, 184(20), pp.5230-5246.

Rohde, V., Herrmann, A., Balden, M., Bösser, D., Hunger, K., Schall, G., Uhlmann, M., Vierle, T. and Team, A.U., 2020. Recovery from a hot water leakage at the tokamak ASDEX Upgrade. Fusion Engineering and Design, 157, p.111630.

Guijarro Fernandez, R. and Sancho Naval, D., 2021. Fuel Handling System for Gas Conversion-Sisu Diesel 420 DWRIE.

Yu, Q., Hui, H. and Gong, J., 2018, July. Design Research of the Double Rupture Disc Safety Relief Device Used on the Long Tube Trailer. In IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering (Vol. 394, No. 3, p. 032052). IOP Publishing.

Russell, P., Ullah, Q. and Krishnan, V.V., 2020, February. Risk Assessment Procedure and Documentation for a Hydrogen Production Laboratory. In H2FC Supergen Hydrogen Research Conference 2020.

Geng, J. and Hu, Y., 2021, March. Quantitative risk correction method of storage tank based on safety measures. In Journal of Physics: Conference Series (Vol. 1827, No. 1, p. 012088). IOP Publishing.

Yong, S., Jun, L., Dawei, L., Jirong, X. and Yan, C., 2021, July. A Calculation Method of Fragment Initial Velocity of Blast-fragmentation Warhead Based on Neural Network. In Journal of Physics: Conference Series (Vol. 1961, No. 1, p. 012003). IOP Publishing.