Air Carrier Liability and Compensation Under the Warsaw System Assignment Sample

Introduction

The Warsaw System comprises several international conventions designed to regulate air carrier liability in cases of passenger injury, death, or damage to luggage and cargo. First implemented in 1929, these conventions were amended through the years to address problems arising from the growth of air travel[1]. Willful misconduct of the air carrier and its principals does not result in forfeiture. This paper discusses the liability of the carrier and the limits of compensation as defined by the Warsaw System. It focuses on the analysis of key issues based on the old threshold for compensation, uneven distribution in several conventions, and insufficient coverage. More than that, it looks into giving suitable proposals for establishing a more equal and fair system for parties of transportation.

Overview of the Warsaw System and its Conventions

The Warsaw System refers to a series of international treaties and protocols that regulate air carrier liability for passenger injuries, deaths, and damage to cargo and luggage. The most important part of the system is the Warsaw Convention of 1929, which was created by countries to establish and propose uniform liability standards for international air travel[2]. Since its inception, the regime has undergone significant overhauls and has reached a crossroads with the Montreal Convention of 1999, which attempted to correct several shortcomings of previous versions.

The Warsaw Convention (1929)

The Warsaw Convention was signed in 1929, taking into consideration the increasing numbers of international air travel accidents and consequential liability on the passengers and cargo. If a passenger died or were injured during international flights, the airline would incur strict liability, but such liability was capped at $20,000. The compensation for lost or damaged luggage stood at $1,000. It did have, however, a tremendous impact in establishing the international context of uniform liability that is much needed in this rapidly developing industry[3]. However, such predetermined limits set by restrictions were soon recognized to need to be increased as the volume and importance of air travel rose.

The Hague Protocol (1955)

The Hague Protocol of 1955 was an important amendment to the basic Warsaw Convention. This aimed at raising the limits of compensation for passengers, making the ceiling on damages for fatalities or personal injuries increased from $20,000 to $75,000. It also expanded the scope of liability of the carrier by stripping some legal defences that the carriers were using to shun liability for damages[4]. The agreement also clarified that the onus of proving the damage or injury started due to an extraordinary event over which the carrier had no control rested with the carriers. Even with such clarifications, many problems remained, such as the modest scope of compensation and courts in various countries' application of the protocol.

The Montreal Convention (1999)

The Montreal Convention, 1999 This revision gave the 1999 Montreal Convention the stature of a new development in the Warsaw System, as this significantly altered and harmonized previous conventions. One of the most obvious changes was the abolition of liability limits relating to injuries or deaths of passengers. In contrast, the Montreal Convention established a two-tier framework: liability on the part of the airline will be strict only for the first €113,100 (with periodic inflationary adjustments), and an airline will avoid liability absolutely only if it establishes that it was without fault[5]. This, yet again, poses a huge problem with past conventions; liability limits were not in tandem with what costs injury or death accrues to this day in aviation. Moreover, the Montreal Convention introduced a no-fault regime of damage for some of the claims so that it has become easier for the passenger to claim compensation without requiring to prove the airliner is careless.

Comparison Between the Conventions

Although the Warsaw and Hague Protocol systems were criticized in that the limits of compensation were too low and liability was very narrow, the Montreal Convention was a better balanced and equitable approach toward protecting the passenger without neglecting the airline's financial burden.[6] Greater flexibility was also available in the Montreal Convention, where it defined items like compensation for emotional distress, which was never considered before. Despite these developments, both systems continued to face limitations, including uneven application to different jurisdictions and the difficulty of meeting the quantum requirement for non-economic damages, such as psychological harm or extended emotional distress.

Liability of the Carrier under the Warsaw System

Although it elaborated the fundamentals of liability by carrier in international air transportation, the Warsaw System itself includes liability for injury or death of passengers and loss or damage to cargo or luggage. However, when the Warsaw Convention 1929 tried to bring out the liability of air travel onto uniform ground, still several defects and shortcomings occurred to rectify those followed further through protocols and conventions, particularly through the Montreal Convention 1999.

Carrier's Responsibility under the Warsaw Convention (1929)

The airline, or the carrier, was liable for any injuries to passengers on international journeys under the Warsaw Convention. International carriage, according to the Convention, refers to the carriage of passengers or goods from one country to another and strictly holds the carrier liable for death or injury to passengers and damage or loss to baggage and freight. Moreover, it was only limited to a certain amount of $20,000 regarding the injury or death of passengers and $1,000 regarding luggage lost or damaged[7]. These limitations were strongly criticized because they were considered too low in light of rising daily costs of healthcare and lost wages in cases of mortal injuries or fatalities resulting from air accidents. The system contained loopholes which would enable carriers to avoid liability in a situation such as when damage resulted from "acts of God" or force majeure events or when the airline demonstrated that they had taken all reasonable care to avoid the damage. Thus, the strict liability framework established by the Warsaw Convention often brought little compensation to the unfortunate passengers of an aircraft, especially in severe damage or injury cases.

Liability under the Hague Protocol (1955)

The Hague Protocol adopted in 1955 corrected several deficiencies of the original Warsaw system, which included deficient levels of compensation ceilings and the capacity of carriers to avoid liability. This raised from $20,000 to $75,000 the maximum liability limits of the loss of life or personal injury of passengers and expanded carrier liability, thus limiting the capacity of the carrier to claim defences based on circumstances outside its control[8]. Importantly, it also introduced the concept of increased liability on the side of the air carrier in regard to cargo damages and other unusual incidents[9]. Despite all this, the Hague Protocol failed to provide adequate solutions to passengers' problem of inadequate compensation. It simply continued with tight caps on what the carriers would be required to pay out in cases of injury or death. Increased compensation was perceived as some form of positive change; however, it contributed minimally to surpassing the growing costs of accidents associated with air transport.

Liability under the Montreal Convention (1999)

The Montreal Convention of 1999 introduced tremendous changes in the legal system governing carrier liability in international aviation. It incorporated vital changes from previous conventions, particularly regarding the limitations on liability and justifications open for carrier defences.

The Montreal Convention abolished the ceilings on liability regarding death or injury to passengers and instead established a two-tiered regime. Under this regime, the carrier is strictly liable for all injuries or deaths to passengers within the amount of €113,100, which is periodically adjusted for inflation. In other words, passengers do not need to demonstrate any negligence on the part of the airline to recover their loss[10]. Furthermore, suppose the damages are over the strict liability threshold in such a scenario. In that case, the liability exemption of the carrier is only feasible if it proves that damage resulted from extraordinary circumstances, possibly acts of war or terrorism, or results from passengers. The transition to a no-fault compensation system for the initial €113,100 effectively remedies a significant deficiency inherent in the Warsaw System, which required passengers to establish fault in order to be eligible for compensation. The Montreal Convention establishes a more explicit structure for assessing liability and has demonstrated greater efficacy in safeguarding the interests of passengers, thereby ensuring that they obtain compensation for their losses.

Carrier Defences and Burden of Proof

Under the Warsaw Convention, the carrier could avoid liability by demonstrating that the damage or injury was not caused by its fault or that it had taken all necessary precautions to prevent the damage. This made it very cumbersome for the passengers since proof of fault was considered a great burden. Although the Hague Protocol somewhat restricted these defences, the overall system remained full of complexity and confusion. The initial €113,100 in compensation was thus placed on the airline to prove[11]. Under this, the liability would only relieve the airlines if it can prove that the damage was outside its control, such as by third parties or force majeure. This has simplified the process for the traveller and made it easier for them to gain compensation; however, some legal experts argue that specific exceptions make the system vulnerable to exploitation by carriers in specific situations.

Current Issues and Gaps

Despite these developments, several concerns remain in terms of carrier liability under the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions. The levels of compensation could be more adequate, particularly because they ignore increasing medical treatment costs, pain and suffering, and residual injury effects. In addition, there is no broad applicability of these conventions globally since different countries apply and interpret the rules differently, which then becomes a jurisdictional matter for people travelling to seek compensation.

Extent of Compensation for Damage under the Warsaw System

The most fundamental concern that the Warsaw System and all its subsequent conventions addressed is the level of compensation payable to passengers and other claimants, particularly in the event of death, injury, or damage to luggage or cargo. Much development notwithstanding, the issue of the adequacy of compensation, calculation methods, and payment limits still needs to be clarified.

Compensation for Death or Injury

The monetary compensation that was initially provided for fatalities or injuries of passengers, according to the first Warsaw Convention set up in 1929, is only up to $20,000. This sum was seen as inadequate since it did not account for the real costs associated with severe injury or death, especially in comparison to air travel nowadays[12]. Over the years, the Hague Protocol of 1955 raised this amount to $75,000; however, it needed to be more effective in addressing the rising medical costs, lost salaries, and complexity that characterized modern aviation accidents.

The 1999 Montreal Convention ushered in the most significant evolution: a two-tier compensation scheme[13]. It provided a strict upper compensation limit of €113,100 indexed each year to inflation on the death or injury of any passenger. So, the carrier becomes liable automatically that much without proof of fault. This modified approach, therefore, dealt with the core complaint that passengers should not be made to prove the negligence of the carrier to claim compensation.

The Montreal Convention further allows a passenger to claim additional damages over the amount of €113,100 where they can prove the carriers were at fault, but such damages are still capped with all of the carrier's defences available[14]. Despite these developments, the cap on compensation provided for under the Montreal Convention still needs to be higher. The reality of the situation is that medical costs associated with long-term health care and economic costs associated with permanent disabilities resulting from air accidents often outweigh monetary reparation under this ceiling. With the rising tide of medical-related costs, there is an ongoing drive to increase the compensatory ceilings to reflect better actual costs incurred from air accident liability.

Compensation for Damage to Luggage and Cargo

The Warsaw Convention also originally provided for a liability cap on luggage at $1,000, with cargo compensation set at $1 per kilogram. The amounts applied when the Convention came into effect but have steadily become obsolete over time because the value of goods and services in the world economy has increased, as have air freight and air travel volumes[15]. The Hague Protocol of 1955 increased liability to $1,500 per passenger on baggage but did not reflect the growing value of goods or the compensation needed for serious damage to cargo. The Montreal Convention of 1999 increased the limit for luggage damage to €1,131 per passenger and cargo damage limits to €17 per kilogram[16]. Although the Montreal Convention introduced several advances, it has been criticized for its persistent failure to provide adequate compensation to owners of lost or damaged bags, especially those containing valuable goods such as electronics, jewellery, and other high-end items. Such a limitation poses enormous obstacles to travellers and cargo owners who are subjected to severe losses far higher than the thresholds established in the Convention.

Non-economic Damages

Although the Warsaw System and its affiliate conventions were able to record considerable success in bringing some restoration for economic compensations for medical expenses, loss of earnings and luggage damage and not successfully address non-economic losses, such as pain, suffering and psychological injuries along with others, the Convention failed to acknowledge claims with respect to these damages and its failure saw victims going uninsured in light of the psychological injuries endured after the accident was witnessed to have occurred[17]. The Montreal Convention formulated a rule that deals with psychological damages or emotional stress arising from injuries to the passenger, especially after accidents bring about psychological harm. Such a claim, however, is weighed down by complicated legal procedures and rules of evidence, making it problematic for passengers to succeed in seeking compensation for such damage. Non-economic damages cannot be measured and often require judicial authority to determine[18]. For example, in the UK, people whose psychological damage is initiated may be forced to appeal for a ruling over their claims in a court of law, which does not always come with fair compensation.

Problems with Liability and Compensation under the Warsaw System

The Warsaw System, a group of conventions and protocols providing uniform regulations on liability issues between air carriers and the extent to which reparation is available to passengers, faces so many challenges. The inadequacy of the degree of compensation for grave damage, limited liability, complexities, and inconsistencies about its implementation in the different legal systems are some of these problems. With the development of air travel and its attendant dangers, many elements of the Warsaw System have gradually become outdated, thus piling up loopholes in the protection available to passengers.

i) Insufficient Compensation Limits

The most important limitation that has been associated with the Warsaw System is its limitation on compensation. The $20,000 ceiling on injury or death of a passenger established under the Warsaw Convention soon proved woefully inadequate, given the growing practice of air travel and the increasing severity of injuries inflicted on air passengers. To do away with this, the 1955 Hague Protocol raised compensation to $75,000, still not enough to pay for all medical treatment, loss of earnings or, sometimes, mental anguish arising from seriously injuring someone[19]. Even after the Montreal Convention 1999, which increased the ceiling amount in case of injury or death to a passenger to €113,100 indexed periodically against inflation, the compensations were still not sufficient enough for more severe damage. In that regard, long-term care and psychological trauma obviously result in losses far beyond these compensation ceilings. For instance, individuals whose disability is permanent or who require lifelong medical attention might find that the threshold on compensation is too low to cover their long-term expenditures and thus end up short changing their actual losses.

ii) Inconsistencies Across Jurisdictions

The Warsaw System, although giving a universal framework, at times appears inconsistent in the application of conventions in most legal jurisdictions. Various countries have different interpretations of the conventions. Hence, the decisions of the courts on liability and compensation vary. Such variations come from the extent of enforcing and interpreting liability from the conventions[20]. In some countries, for instance, airlines can limit liability because national statutes contradict international conventions, thus exposing the passengers in those regions to risk. Jurisdictional issues add more complications to the claim procedures under the Warsaw System. The problem arises in determining a country where claims can be filed in cases where an accident occurs in more than one jurisdiction. The Montreal Convention attempted to clear up the jurisdiction procedures by making the process of filing claims simpler, but issues still arise, especially on forum shopping, wherein the parties seek the jurisdiction that will provide the best judgment for the airline.

iii) Legal Defences Available to Carriers

The Warsaw System and subsequent regimes offer transporters numerous defences that may reduce their potential liability. For example, transporters often assert the defence that the loss resulted from "exceptional circumstances," including events of God (such as natural disasters) or acts of terrorism. Although this regulation provides some safeguards for carriers, it puts passengers in danger if the elements of damage are established by negligence on the part of the carrier or a failure to observe safety measures[21]. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention grants carriers a right to limit their liability in connection with cargo damage and loss of luggage where they can demonstrate that factors outside their control caused such damage. The defences erect barriers for passengers to recover compensation unless they can satisfy the burden of proving that the airline itself was directly at fault, a burden that often proves challenging, especially where the issues are complex and multi-player ones.

Proposals for Improvement and Solutions

The Warsaw System has undergone significant changes over the years, especially since the adoption of the Montreal Convention in 1999. Still, several key problems still need to be addressed, and the limits of compensation, defences to liability, and inconsistencies that exist between jurisdictions are prominent. We propose a number of solutions that would strengthen the liability and compensation framework, leading to higher equity and consistency among passengers.

i) Raising Compensation Limits

One of the major criticisms is that the compensation thresholds set for loss of life, injuries, and damage to luggage or cargo are grossly insubstantial. Even though the Montreal Convention increases the limit to €113,100 in cases of passenger injury or death, the amount remains derisory, especially in serious cases where passengers suffer lasting medical repercussions or permanent disability[22]. The compensation thresholds can be increased along with the inflationary trends and the rise in cost-of-living expenditure, considering the prevailing medical care costs and economic implications of injury sustenance. An independent review process may be introduced so that figures for compensation remain relevant and adequate at all points in time.

ii) Simplifying the Claims Process

The process of filing claims under the Warsaw System is complex and will make issues to jurisdiction and demonstration of liability for passengers. A way would be developing a process that will be more standardized and straightforward in filling claims to allow passengers to file one claim in whatever jurisdiction of the accident has occurred[23]. The framework of the Montreal Convention can easily be smoothed out to deal with jurisdiction problems and provide guidelines on where to file claims across different international jurisdictions.

iii) Expanding Compensation for Non-Economic Losses

Improved Non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering, have become extremely difficult to prosecute under the Warsaw System. One possible answer would be to make more specific criteria for emotional distress or psychological harm in aeroplane accident situations, with a list of presumed damages for mental suffering arising from serious injury or loss, particularly when the physical injury is serious[24]. The system may additionally offer greater flexibility in compensation for non-economic damages, recognizing the continued emotional effect associated with air travel incidents.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, the Warsaw System and its subsequent conventions have played a significant role in establishing an international framework for the liability and compensation of air carriers. While the Montreal Convention (1999) improved several weaknesses of the original system, some significant issues remain. These include low thresholds for compensation, conflicting jurisdiction, and the inability to address non-monetary damages such as emotional distress. The proposed steps: cap-setting, simplifying the filing process, the expansion of indemnification for non-economic damages and limiting carrier defences will also bring passengers closer to a more equitable and systematic mechanism for their protection. There is also a need for an effective worldwide plan of enforcement to ensure that passengers, no matter where in the world, will get fair compensation on time for their injuries. These reforms are necessary to ensure that the Warsaw System continues to meet the demands of modern air travel and, in doing so, provides just compensation to affected passengers.

References

• Andersen, S O, Gao, S, Carvalho, S, Ferris, T, Gonzalez, M, Sherman, N J, Zaelke, D, ‘Narrowing Feedstock Exemptions Under the Montreal Protocol Has Multiple Environmental Benefits’ (2021) 118(49) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences e2022668118.
• Arja, I, ‘Willful Misconduct of the Air Carrier and its Principals Does Not Result in Forfeiture of the Two-Year Statute of Limitations under Article 29 of the 1929 Warsaw Convention and Article 35 of the 1999 Montreal Convention: A Confirmation from US Case Law’ (2023) 1 DIRITTO DEI TRASPORTI 199.
• Balasuriya, B M A H H, ‘Liability of the Air Carrier for the Death and Injury of a Passenger’ (2023).
• Barańska, A M, ‘Different Concepts of “Accident” in the Meaning of the Montreal Convention and Air Carrier Liability in EU Law’ (2020).
• Bernard, N, ‘Taking Air Passenger Rights Seriously: The Case Against the Exclusivity of the Montreal Convention’ (2021) 23(4) International Community Law Review 313.
• Cluxton, D, ‘The West Caribbean Conundrum: The United States Versus France on the Availability of Forum Non Conveniens Under the Montreal Convention of 1999’ (2020) 85 J. Air L. & Com. 3.
• Fuhrmann, M. (2019). Spatial, social and economical dynamic of contemporary Warsaw–City profile. Cities, 94, 286-295.
• Gheoculescu, A. V. (2021). CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR LUGGAGE, SHORT SENDING TO AIR TRANSPORT RESPONSIBILITY. Istorie, Cultura, Cetatenie in Uniunea Europeana, 13(1), 470-479.
• Hladík, J, ‘How the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 Contribute to Better Protection of Cultural Property’ (2022) 104(920-921) International Review of the Red Cross 1948.
• Jueptner, E, ‘The Hague Jurisdiction Project–What Options for the Hague Conference?’ (2020) 16(2) Journal of Private International Law 247.
• Kusiak, J. (2019). Legal technologies of primitive accumulation: Judicial robbery and dispossession‐by‐restitution in Warsaw. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 43(4), 649-665.
• Liakopoulos, D. (2019). Jurisprudential approach of the aircraft liability according to international and EU rules. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Relationes Internationales, 12(1), 137-209.
• Machnikowski, P, ‘Compensation for Accidents in Poland’ (2019) 16 Otago L. Rev. 157.
• Machnikowski, P. (2019). Compensation for Accidents in Poland. Otago L. Rev., 16, 157.
• Nyangaga, J O, ‘The Scope and Limitation on Legal Liability for Compensation by the Airline Companies to Their Passengers Infected by Coronavirus (COVID-19) Through Airline’s Negligence While on Board an Aeroplane’ (2020) 9(01) International Journal of Applied Service Marketing Perspectives 3754.
• Poláček, B. (2019). International Air Carriage Liability. Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, 27(4), 491-517.
• Sadowy, K. and Lisiecki, A., 2019. Post-industrial, post-socialist or new productive city? Case study of the spatial and functional change of the chosen Warsaw industrial sites after 1989. City, Territory and Architecture, 6, pp.1-14.
• Sariwati, R, ‘Responsibilities of Air Carriers on International Flights’ (2022) 13(2) Jurnal Cakrawala Hukum 194.
• Serdeczny, O, ‘Non-economic Loss and Damage and the Warsaw International Mechanism’ in Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options (2019) 205-220.
• Sipos, A, ‘The Air Carrier's Liability for Damage Caused to Cargo’ (2020) 59 Annales U. Sci. Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos Nominatae 155.
• Sipos, A. (2020). The Air Carrier's Liability for Damage Caused to Cargo. Annales U. Sci. Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos Nominatae, 59, 155.
• Yılmaz, M, ‘The Evolution of the Obligation of Seaworthiness from the Hague Rules to the Rotterdam Rules’ (2021) 29(2) Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 881.
• Arja, I, ‘Willful Misconduct of the Air Carrier and its Principals Does Not Result in Forfeiture of the Two-Year Statute of Limitations under Article 29 of the 1929 Warsaw Convention and Article 35 of the 1999 Montreal Convention: A Confirmation from US Case Law’ (2023) 1 DIRITTO DEI TRASPORTI 199.
• Balasuriya, B M A H H, ‘Liability of the Air Carrier for the Death and Injury of a Passenger’ (2023).
• Nyangaga, J O, ‘The Scope and Limitation on Legal Liability for Compensation by the Airline Companies to Their Passengers Infected by Coronavirus (COVID-19) Through Airline’s Negligence While on Board an Aeroplane’ (2020) 9(01) International Journal of Applied Service Marketing Perspectives 3754.
• Hladík, J, ‘How the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 Contribute to Better Protection of Cultural Property’ (2022) 104(920-921) International Review of the Red Cross 1948.
• Bernard, N, ‘Taking Air Passenger Rights Seriously: The Case Against the Exclusivity of the Montreal Convention’ (2021) 23(4) International Community Law Review 313.
• Jueptner, E, ‘The Hague Jurisdiction Project–What Options for the Hague Conference?’ (2020) 16(2) Journal of Private International Law 247.
• Barańska, A M, ‘Different Concepts of “Accident” in the Meaning of the Montreal Convention and Air Carrier Liability in EU Law’ (2020).
• Sariwati, R, ‘Responsibilities of Air Carriers on International Flights’ (2022) 13(2) Jurnal Cakrawala Hukum 194
• Yılmaz, M, ‘The Evolution of the Obligation of Seaworthiness from the Hague Rules to the Rotterdam Rules’ (2021) 29(2) Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 881.
• Nyangaga, J O, ‘The Scope and Limitation on Legal Liability for Compensation by the Airline Companies to Their Passengers Infected by Coronavirus (COVID-19) Through Airline’s Negligence While on Board an Aeroplane’ (2020) 9(01) International Journal of Applied Service Marketing Perspectives 3754
• Jueptner, E, ‘The Hague Jurisdiction Project–What Options for the Hague Conference?’ (2020) 16(2) Journal of Private International Law 247.
• Sipos, A, ‘The Air Carrier's Liability for Damage Caused to Cargo’ (2020) 59 Annales U. Sci. Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos Nominatae 155
• [13] Machnikowski, P, ‘Compensation for Accidents in Poland’ (2019) 16 Otago L. Rev. 157.
• Andersen, S O, Gao, S, Carvalho, S, Ferris, T, Gonzalez, M, Sherman, N J, Zaelke, D, ‘Narrowing Feedstock Exemptions Under the Montreal Protocol Has Multiple Environmental Benefits’ (2021) 118(49) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences e2022668118.
• Sipos, A. (2020). The Air Carrier's Liability for Damage Caused to Cargo. Annales U. Sci. Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos Nominatae, 59, 155.
• Poláček, B. (2019). International Air Carriage Liability. Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, 27(4), 491-517.
• Liakopoulos, D. (2019). Jurisprudential approach of the aircraft liability according to international and EU rules. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Relationes Internationales, 12(1), 137-209.
• Gheoculescu, A. V. (2021). CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR LUGGAGE, SHORT SENDING TO AIR TRANSPORT RESPONSIBILITY. Istorie, Cultura, Cetatenie in Uniunea Europeana, 13(1), 470-479.
• Arja, I, ‘Willful Misconduct of the Air Carrier and its Principals Does Not Result in Forfeiture of the Two-Year Statute of Limitations under Article 29 of the 1929 Warsaw Convention and Article 35 of the 1999 Montreal Convention: A Confirmation from US Case Law’ (2023) 1 DIRITTO DEI TRASPORTI 199
• Serdeczny, O, ‘Non-economic Loss and Damage and the Warsaw International Mechanism’ in Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options (2019) 205-220.
• Cluxton, D, ‘The West Caribbean Conundrum: The United States Versus France on the Availability of Forum Non Conveniens Under the Montreal Convention of 1999’ (2020) 85 J. Air L. & Com. 3.
• Fuhrmann, M. (2019). Spatial, social and economical dynamic of contemporary Warsaw–City profile. Cities, 94, 286-295.
• Sadowy, K. and Lisiecki, A., 2019. Post-industrial, post-socialist or new productive city? Case study of the spatial and functional change of the chosen Warsaw industrial sites after 1989. City, Territory and Architecture, 6, pp.1-14.
• Kusiak, J. (2019). Legal technologies of primitive accumulation: Judicial robbery and dispossession‐by‐restitution in Warsaw. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 43(4), 649-665.